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RECENT DECISIONS
The statute is constitutional; 15 it is neither vague nor uncertain
in failing to fix a definite standard of guilt nor in informing the
accused ones of the nature and cause of the accusation. If the restraint
upon the doctors was the direct result of the activity of the defendants,
any indirect effect it may have had upon the association or hospitals
would not suffice to support the charges as to them.16
There is no doubt of the persuasive influence of this decision on
the law of ,those states where similar provisions against combinations
for restraint of trade exist.'1 It is also interesting to consider the
effect of this decision upon the practice of law, in the light of the
analogous relationship between medical society and physician, in the
one instance, and bar association and attorney, in the other. Although
the influence of the bar associations has manifested itself in the main-
tenance of an ideal standard of ethics for the bar, such influence is
not incapable of abuse. It remains to be seen whether or not bar
associations might be engaged in restraint of "trade" in the enforce-
ment of their requirements upon the legal profession. However, in
view of the decision in the instant case, it is most improbable that the
practice of law would be considered a trade.
This decision, based as it is on a technical definition of the word
"trade", is to be regretted as it may impede the development of group
health associations and the furnishing of medical relief to the low-
income group who cannot otherwise afford to obtain complete and
adequate medical care. However, the door is left open for tort lia-
bility in cases of this sort which may or may not act as a deterrent to
the alleged restrictive activities of the defendant medical societies.' 8
C. B. D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE
PROCESS-FREED M OF SPEECH AND RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY-FEDERAL
JURISDICTION.-The Committee for Industrial Organization 1 and
doctors suffered in the restraint of their profession, the court does not infer,
however, that the practice of medicine is a trade.
15 Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780 (1913).
18 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 179, 51 Sup. Ct. 421
(1931).
17 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 23 prohibits corporations doing business in
New York State from combining "with any other corporation or person for the
creation of a monopoly or for the unlawful restraint of trade or for the pre-
vention of competition in any necessary of life." N. Y. GENERAL BUSINESS
LAW § 340 (Donnelly Anti-Trust Act) declares void and illegal agreements
for monopoly and "every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination
whereby * * * competition or the free exercise of any activity in this state in
*** trade practice is or may be restrained or prevented * * * ".
18 In the present case, the group practitioners undoubtedly had a cause of
action in tort for damages to their livelihood if they had been injured by the
alleged wrongful acts of the defendants.
1 Now called Congress of Industrial Organizations. The purpose of this
body is to organize into labor unions unorganized workers and to cause such
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others 2 instituted suit in the Jnited States District Court in New
Jersey against Frank Hague, individually and as Mayor of Jersey
City, and others,3 to enjoin interference with the plaintiff's rights of
freedom of speech and of assembly, in refusing to permit them to
make public addresses or distribute printed matter in Jersey City
concerning the National Labor Relations Act and its operation. De-
fendants based their justification for refusing to grant such a permit
upon a local ordinance 4 which gave the Director of Public Safety of
Jersey City the discretion to refuse permits for assembly and public
speaking on the ground that the same might lead to rioting and public
disorder. The Circuit Court of Appeals 5 modified and affirmed the
District Court's judgment 6 in favor of the plaintiffs. Upon certiorari
to the Supreme Court, held, two judges dissenting, the ordinance is
unconstitutional ynder the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Court had jurisdiction under Judicial Code
§ 24(14) to declare it void as against the individual plaintiffs regard-
less of their citizenship or of the amount in controversy, but having
decreed the ordinance void, the Court should not have enjoined the
defendants as to the manner in which they should administer it.
Hague et al. v. Committee for Industrial Organization et al., - U. S.
-, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
labor unions to function as collective bargaining agencies for the betterment of
terms and conditions of employment. Hague v. C. I. 0., 101 F. (2d) 774, 779
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
2 The plaintiffs are the C. I. 0., labor organizations affiliated with the
C. I. 0., individual representatives of such organizations, and the American
Civil Liberties Union, a membership corporation whose work consists of taking
measures deemed by it to be essential for the enforcement of the rights secured
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
3 The defendants are the Mayor of Jersey City, the Director of Public
Safety, the Chief of Pblice, and the Board of Commissioners of Jersey City.
4 "The Board of Commissioners of Jersey City Do Ordain:
"1. From and after the passage of this ordinance, no public parades or
public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks
or public buildings of Jersey City shall take place or be conducted
until a permit shall be obtained from the Director of Public Safety.
"2. The Director of Public Safety is hereby authorized and empowered
to grant permits for parades and public assembly, upon application
made to him at least three days prior to the proposed parade or
public assembly.
"3. The Director of Public Safety is hereby authorized to refuse to
issue said permit when, after investigation of all of the facts and
circumstances pertinent to said application, he believes it to be
proper to refuse the issuance thereof; provided, however, that said
permit shall only be refused for the purpose of preventing riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage.
"4. Any person or persons violating-any of the provisions of this ordi-
nance shall upon conviction before a police magistrate of the City
of Jersey City be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred
dollars or imprisonment in the Hudson County jail for a period not
exceeding ninety days or both."
5 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
625 F. Supp. 127 (D. C. N. J. 1938).
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There was no proof or finding of fact that any of the plaintiffs
were citizens of the United States. That, however, was not neces-
sary for the maintenance of this action because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.7  And under Section 1979
of the Revised Statutes any person within the jurisdiction of the
United States, whether a citizen or not, may bring an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, for the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United
States Constitution or federal statutes.8 The individual plaintiffs and
not the corporate plaintiff, the American, Civil Liberties Union, can
get relief because the liberty guaranteed by the "due process clause"
of the Fourteenth Amendment is he liberty of natural, not artificial
persons.9
The federal courts are given jurisdiction in suits under the
United States Constitution and statutes by the judicial Code § 24(1)10
which confers authority over action in which the amount in contro-
versy exceeds a specified value, and by the Judicial Code § 24(14)11
which gives the Court jurisdiction of suits regardless of the amount
in controversy. The acts are not contradictory and are to be exer-
cised in harmony.12  The civil rights, contested by the suit at bar,
are such that are incapable of possessing a pecuniary valuation and
are therefore subject to the jurisdiction conferred by the Judicial
Code § 24(14).13
The prohibition against states in the Fourteenth Amendment is
not limited to legislative enactments,1 4 but may be extended to em-
7 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) ; Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S.
380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655 (1927) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct.
625 (1931); Grojean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444
(1936) ; Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937) ; Herdon v.
Lowery, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1937) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
8 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U. S. C. § 43 (1934) ("Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of U. S. or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress").
9 Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. 281 (1869) ; Western
Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384 (1907) ; see North-
vestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 27 Sup. Ct. 126 (1906).
1018 STAT. 470 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1934).
136 STAT. 1092(1911), 28 U. S. C. §41(14) (1934).
22 Board of Com'rs of Seward County v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 222
(C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ; Hemmer- v. United States, 204 Fed. 898 (C. C. A. 8th,
1912) ; Chase v. United States, 238 Fed. 887 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
23 Kurtz v. Moffet, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148 (1885) ; Holt v. Indiana
Manufacturing Co., 176 U. S. 68, 20 Sup. Ct. 272 (1900); Horn v. Mitchell,
243 U. S. 247, 37 Sup. Ct. 293 (1917).
14 Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 168 (D. C. Tenn. 1898).
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brace acts performed under the authority of a municipal ordinance. 15
Although these fundamental rights are not absolute,16 they may not
be curtailed by the police power of the state because of previous re-
straint 17 or because the state authorities believe that the exercise of
these rights may lead to riots or disorder.1 8 Consequently, the streets
and parks, held by the city in trust for the people, must be open for
the use of the people in order that they may exercise their rights of
free speech and assembly.' 9
Although an ordinance is valid on its face, the fact that it is car-
ried out in illegal and discriminatory manner, as was true in this case,
renders it unconstitutional under the "equal protection clause" of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 0  The purpose of this clause is to pro-
tect the people against intentional and arbitrary discrimination 2 ' or
oppressive inequality either under an illegal statute or by improper
execution by the officers acting under it.
22
The very nature of a democracy implies a right on the part of
its residents to peaceably assemble for the discussion of public affairs
and to petition for a redress of grievances and this should be upheld
at all times and at all costs.
C.G.
15 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (1875).
16 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) ("Freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer
an absolute right to speak or publish * * * ") ; Shaefer v. United States, 251
U. S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357,
47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625(1931).
17 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
Is In his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 247 U. S. 357, 378,
47 Sup. Ct. 641, 649 (1927), Justice Brandeis stated: "The fact that speech is
likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough tojustify its suppression." See New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, 89 N. J.
Eq. 387, 388, 105 Atl. 78 (1918).
19 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Forty-second St. and Grand St. Ferry R. R.,
176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E. 864 (1903) ; City of New York v. New York Ry., 217
N. Y. 310, 112 N. E. 49 (1916).
20 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (1875); Baily v. Alabama, 219
U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. 145 (1911).
21 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921); Joseph S.
Finch & Co. v. McKitrick, 23 F. Supp. 244 (D. C. Mo. 1938).
22 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886). In Sunday
Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352, 38 Sup. Ct. 495(1918), Justice McReynolds said: "The purpose of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the state's juris-
diction against arbitrary and intentional discrimination, whether occasioned by
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents." In People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 103, 13 N. E. 364,
367 (1920), Cardozo, J., said: "The Mayor refused a permit, it is said, because
the applicants were Socialists. If that is so he was guilty of a grave abuse
of power."
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